There were no other convictions until 2002, one between 2005 and 2007. If you have convictions due to conflict, these convictions will be assessed under “Consider additional factors” in accordance with the guidelines for employers in the Office of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. Political parties in Northern Ireland, which endorsed the agreement, were also invited to consider the creation of an independent advisory forum, with members of civil society with social, cultural, economic and other expertise, and appointed by both administrations. In 2002, a framework for the North-South Consultation Forum was agreed, and in 2006 the Northern Ireland Executive agreed to support its establishment. The overall result of these problems was to undermine unionists` confidence in the agreement exploited by the anti-deal DUP, which eventually overtook the pro-deal Unionist Party (UUP) in the 2003 parliamentary elections. The UUP had already resigned from the power-sharing executive in 2002 following the Stormontgate scandal, which implicated three men for gathering intelligence. These charges were eventually dropped in 2005 on the controversial grounds that the persecution was not “in the public interest”. Immediately afterwards, one of the incriminated members of Sinn Féin, Denis Donaldson, was unmasked as a British agent. These institutional arrangements, which have been established in these three areas, are defined in the agreement as “interdependent and interdependent”. In particular, it is found that the functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the North-South Council of Ministers is “so closely linked that the success of the other depends on the success of the other”, and participation in the North-South Council of Ministers is “one of the essential tasks related to the relevant posts in [Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland]”. The agreement called for the creation of an independent commission to audit police rules in Northern Ireland, “including ways to promote broad community support” for these agreements.
The UK government has also pledged to “carry out a comprehensive review” of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. The main problems that Sunningdale omitted and addressed in the Belfast Agreement are the principle of self-determination, the recognition of both national identities, Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation and legal procedures to make power-sharing compulsory, such as inter-municipal voting and the D`Hondt system for appointing ministers for the executive.   Tommy McKearney, a former IRA member and journalist, argues that the main difference is the British government`s intention to negotiate a comprehensive agreement by involving the IRA and the more intransigent unionists.  With regard to the right to self-determination, the jurist Austen Morgan cites two qualifications. Firstly, the transfer of territories from one State to another must be done through an international agreement between the British and Irish Governments. Secondly, the people of Northern Ireland can no longer bring a united Ireland alone; they need not only the Irish Government, but also the citizens of their neighbouring country, Ireland, to support unity. Morgan also pointed out that, unlike the Ireland Act 1949 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, drawn up under Sunningdale, the 1998 Agreement and the resulting UK legislation explicitly provided for the possibility of a united Ireland.  The agreement reaffirmed its commitment to “mutual respect, civil rights and religious freedoms for all in the community.” . .